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ITH each passing year, it seems that school districts are faced
with an increasingly complex variety of laws with which to
comply, and, along with these laws and rules, are an increasing
number of legal actions to defend. This article will survey legal develop-
ments affecting Texas school districts, spanning the time from approxi-
mately October 2000 to October 2001. This article does not attempt an
exhaustive review but merely highlights the significant judicial decisions
issued during the relevant time period. Cases are surveyed by subject,
beginning with student-related issues, followed by a discussion of cases
involving employment, procedure, immunity, open government laws and
federal and constitutional matters.
A. STUDENT ISSUES
Events in recent years have raised security concerns for public schools,
making the balance between school districts' authority to regulate the en-
vironment and student and employee rights a particularly delicate one.
The judiciary seems, for the most part, to have expressed support for
school districts' efforts to maintain safe, orderly schools, as exemplified in
the following case.
1. Student Searches
Shortly after the infamous Columbine shooting, officials at Brazosport
ISD found a threatening letter in a high school computer room.' Several
days later the police frisked and handcuffed fourteen students, who had
associated with the suspect, and transported the students in police cars to
the municipal court where they were detained for several hours. 2 The
police did not incarcerate the students, charge them with a crime, or
physically injure them. The principal publicly announced that the
targeted students had done nothing wrong and instructed the other stu-
* Carolyn Hanahan is an honors graduate of the University of Texas and the Univer-
sity of Texas School of Law. From 1993-2000, she was a staff attorney for the Texas Associ-
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1. Stockton v. City of Freeport, Tex., 147 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
2. Id. at 643.
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dents not to retaliate against them. Even so, several students and teach-
ers harassed the targeted students, prompting the targeted students to sue
the school district and the police department.3
The court found that the students' legitimate and substantial Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure were
outweighed by the school's dramatically compelling interests in "main-
taining a safe place of learning" and preventing "indiscriminate violence
at school."'4 Although the court questioned the school's delay of several
days in acting on its concerns, the court allowed the school some latitude
in deciding how quickly to act in such a situation. The court emphasized
that, even though a less-intrusive means could have been used, the offi-
cials' actions had been effective to prevent violence because "[t]he Fourth
Amendment does not require that a search or seizure be conducted in the
least restrictive means."'5 The court characterized the officials' "ex-
traordinary overreaction" as, "at best, insensitive, heavy-handed actions,
and at worst, bumbling hysteria .... ,,6 Even so, the court dismissed the
students' claims, refusing to second-guess the school and law enforcement
officials in the aftermath of the Columbine tragedy. 7
While the Stockton case confirms that school districts may have
broader authority when responding to threats to student safety, its hold-
ing was premised on the close proximity in time of the Columbine events
to the threats made at Brazosport High. Given the current climate, how-
ever, it seems likely that other courts would apply similar reasoning to
authorize school officials to take action-rather than risk danger-when
presented with a potential crisis. The Stockton case is certainly solid sup-
port for school attorneys to cite in defending a civil rights claim.
School officials have long known that they are not subject to the proba-
ble cause standard in order to search students; they need only have a
reasonable basis for conducting the search.8 In Bundick v. Bay City Inde-
pendent School District, the Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas applied the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard and
upheld the expulsion of a student from school based on the results of a
search of the student's truck.9
During a routine search using trained dogs, a dog alerted to David
Bundick's truck while it was parked at the school parking lot.'0 A school
district patrolman was notified, and Bundick was summoned to the truck.
As requested, Bundick opened the cab and the toolbox, where a machete
was found. The court found that the search of Bundick's truck was con-
3. Id. at 642.
4. Id. at 646-47.
5. Id. at 647.
6. Stockton, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
7. Id.
8. See Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738 (S.D. Tex.
2001).




stitutional. 11 It was justified at its inception, given the dog's alert. The
fact that the search uncovered a machete rather than a suspected sub-
stance was irrelevant.1 2
Bundick complained that his expulsion deprived him of his liberty and
property interests in his education without due process of law, but the
court found this claim to be "without foundation."'1 3 Bundick continued
to make progress in his education, earning sufficient credits to graduate
and receive his diploma. Therefore, he could not complain of being de-
prived of an education; rather, he complained that he was being denied
participation in extracurricular activities.14 Citing Fifth Circuit precedent,
the court held that the federal constitution does not protect a student's
interests in participating in extracurricular activities.1 5 For that matter,
nothing in Texas law would support such a claim.16 Moreover, the court
found that Bundick received more than adequate procedural due process:
he received a conference with the principal three days after the machete
was found, and several weeks later an expulsion hearing, at which he was
represented by an attorney and was permitted to call and cross examine
witnesses.' 7 Thereafter, he was provided an opportunity to present his
appeal to the board. The court held that Bundick had no basis for chal-
lenging the adequacy of the district's procedures.1 8
Finally, Bundick claimed that he did not know the machete was in his
truck, and therefore, school officials had not demonstrated the necessary
mental state to support his expulsion.' 9 Although seemingly tempted by
this argument, the court rejected it, holding that "[s]cienter is not a re-
quirement of the school district's policy, and that policy is entitled to def-
erence." °20 Perhaps more significant was the court's statement adding
that "[s]cienter 'can be imputed from the fact of possession.' ' 21 In so
holding, the court noted that the school district's policy and code of con-
duct, as well as state law, all prohibit possession of an illegal knife.22
Therefore, the school district's expulsion decision could not be said to be
arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or inconsistent with the goals of the
school in a manner that would violate substantive due process rights.23
11. Id. at 739.
12. Id.
13. Bundick, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 561 (Tex.
1985); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Paiz, 856 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1993, no writ)).
17. Id.
18. Bundick, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 740.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 585 (6th Cir. 2000)).
22. Id. at 741.
23. Bundick, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
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2. Student Drug Testing
Since the U.S. Supreme Court granted school districts limited authority
to drug-test students in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,2 4 school
districts have been testing the boundaries of that authority. Two Texas
school districts have met challenges to their policies, both of which went
far beyond the limits of Vernonia.2 5 To date, neither case has offered
clear guidance for schools wishing to drug test students. The decision of
the district court in Gardner v. Tulia Independent School District was not
reported, but it involved a policy that required all students participating
in extracurricular activities to submit to random drug testing as a condi-
tion of their participation in these activities.2 6 The school district's testing
procedures were quite similar to the procedures at issue in the Vernonia
case. Upon receiving an adverse ruling from the district court, the school
district appealed, and the Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments in November
2001.27 Gardner presented the Fifth Circuit with its first opportunity to
consider a student drug testing case since the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Vernonia.
While the Gardner case will hopefully provide school districts with
some direction in the near future, another Texas case, Tannahill v.
Lockney Independent School District, offers little more than an admoni-
tion not to try to extend Vernonia beyond its specific terms.28 The
Lockney school district began with a voluntary drug-testing program in
1997.29 In 1999, it made the program mandatory for all students in grades
six through twelve. All students and their parents were required to sign a
consent form agreeing that the student would submit to an initial test and
random testing thereafter. Any refusal by the student and/or parent to
sign the consent form would be treated as a positive test and would result
in disciplinary action, including possible placement in an alternative
school, disqualification from extracurricular activities, and disqualifica-
tion from receiving honors.30
A sixth grade student and his father sued, claiming that the Lockney
school district's mandatory drug-testing policy violated the Fourth
Amendment. 31 Following guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court recognized that the district's
drug testing program would be constitutional only if the district could
demonstrate a "special need" to test students.32 The court found that the
24. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
25. See Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001);
Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000), appeal filed, No.
00-11404 (5th Cir. June 25, 2001).
26. Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000), appeal
filed, No. 00-11404 (5th Cir. June 25, 2001).
27. Id.
28. 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
29. Id. at 920.
30. Id. at 920-23.
31. Id. at 919.
32. Id. at 924.
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district's drug testing program was not adopted in response to exigent
circumstances such as an identified drug crisis or out of concern for stu-
dent safety.33 Furthermore, the court determined that the policy was
overbroad, because the school district subjected a much larger segment of
the student population to testing than the group of student athletes in
Vernonia.34 Many of the students who were subjected to testing had
higher expectations of privacy than student athletes. In short, the court
concluded that the school district had not demonstrated a special need
sufficient to outweigh students' Fourth Amendment rights.35 Quoting
Justice Brandeis, the court noted: "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing."'36 Accordingly, the court struck down the district's drug testing
program.37 The district appealed, but the case has since settled.
While courts are generally supportive of school districts' efforts to con-
trol the educational environment, this support is not infinite. The courts
in the Fifth Circuit are still reluctant to support efforts to expand drug-
testing of students beyond the parameters of Vernonia.
3. Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment cases brought by students in the past year were re-
solved as directed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education.38 In order to prevail on a claim against a school
district under Title IX, plaintiffs must have a very strong case, including
evidence that school officials were deliberately indifferent to the acts of
alleged sexual harassment. 39
In Wilson v. Beaumont Independent School District, Ken Wilson, a
mildly retarded boy, was repeatedly bullied and picked on by another
mentally retarded boy, John Doe.40 As a result, their teacher made sure
the two were separated in class and on the school bus. One day, however,
the conduct went beyond bullying. After a restroom break, Wilson indi-
cated that John Doe, the alleged harasser, had asked Wilson to perform
oral sex on him and forced him to have anal sex.41 Doe denied this ver-
sion of the events, and when the teacher reported the incident to the prin-
cipal, she told him there had been no sexual contact, despite the fact that
the evidence on this issue was conflicting.42 The school did not notify the
parents, but made sure the boys were separated. 43 A few days later, Wil-
33. Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
34. Id. at 929.
35. Id. at 930.
36. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
37. Id.
38. Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
39. Id. at 650.






son's parents learned about the incident, filed a complaint with Child
Protective Services (CPS), and later filed suit.44
The Wilson court recognized the applicable standard for student-to-stu-
dent sexual harassment under Title IX as that established by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.45 To
support their claims, therefore, the plaintiffs had to show (1) that the har-
assment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could
be said to deprive Ken Wilson of the educational opportunities provided
by the school; (2) the district had actual knowledge of the sexual harass-
ment; and (3) the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.4 6
Applying this test, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that
school officials were deliberately indifferent. 47 The defendants were not
required to remedy sexual harassment, the court observed, but had to
respond to known peer harassment in a manner that was not unreasona-
ble.48 The court found that the students' teacher and the principal took
steps to remedy the situation once they were aware of it.49 The principal,
for example, interviewed the students, contacted CPS and the police de-
partment, interviewed employees and obtained their written statements,
met with Wilson and his parents, and had John Doe transferred to an-
other school. 50
Although the court conceded that, in hindsight, school officials could
have taken "swifter and more appropriate action," the court recognized
that "there is no legal requirement of perfection. 51 School officials were
not, therefore, deliberately indifferent. Nor was the alleged harassment
sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to support Title
IX liability.5 2 The bullying conduct that had occurred throughout the
year was not part of the court's analysis; there was no evidence that it was
gender-related, and there were no other incidents of gender-related har-
assment.5 3 Although the incident of alleged harassment was "unarguably
severe," the court found no systematic effect of denying educational op-
portunities or benefits.5 4 Therefore, it granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment on the Title IX claims.55 In dismissing the federal
claims, the court noted that the plaintiffs could bring their state law
causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and respondeat superior
in state court. 56 The moral of the story for school officials is: do
44. Id.
45. Wilson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629 (1999)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 693.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Wilson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 693.










The Fifth Circuit Court heard two appeals in 2001 from students and
parents objecting to public schools' use of mandatory uniforms.57 Both
cases upheld the school districts' authority to require uniforms, recogniz-
ing that while students may have expression rights in what they wear,
school districts have important interests that may be served by requiring
student uniforms. The school districts' interests have, in these two cases,
outweighed the students' asserted rights. The first case to reach the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals arose in Louisiana, the second in Texas. Both
involved districts that had adopted uniforms pursuant to recently enacted
state laws authorizing the practice. 58
Since 1997, Louisiana school districts have had the discretion to imple-
ment mandatory uniforms.5 9 The Bossier Parish School Board exercised
this option and ordered all of its schools to adopt mandatory uniforms. 60
Several parents filed suit, alleging that the uniform requirement violated
their children's rights to free speech, failed to account for religious pref-
erences, and denied their children's liberty interests to wear clothing of
their choice. The district court granted summary judgment for the school
district, and the parents appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 61
A school board's uniform policy will pass constitutional scrutiny if it
furthers an important governmental interest-one that is unrelated to the
suppression of student expression-and if the incidental restrictions on
First Amendment rights are no more than necessary to facilitate that in-
terest.62 While the court recognized that a person's choice of clothing
may be sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection,
educators do have latitude in regulating student conduct. 63 Further, the
court found that the school district's uniform policy was viewpoint-neu-
tral on its face and as applied. 64 In denying the free speech claim, the
court noted, "it is not the job of the federal courts to determine the most
effective way to educate our nation's youth. ' 65 Here, the school board's
interests, were to increase test scores and reduce disciplinary problems,
not to suppress student speech. 66 Furthermore, the school board pro-
duced evidence that once the uniform policy was implemented, these in-
57. See Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Dist, 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001); Littlefield v.
Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
58. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.162 (Vernon 1996); LA. REV. CIv. STAT.
§ 17.416.7 (West 1997).
59. Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 2001).
60. Id. at 439.
61. Id.
62. Canady, 240 F.3d at 442.
63. Id. at 443
64. Id. at 439.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 444.
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terests were in fact achieved.67 The court rejected the parents' other
arguments, finding that they had not demonstrated infringement of a lib-
erty interest, nor had the district court improperly denied them the op-
portunity to conduct additional discovery. 68
Not long after the Fifth Circuit decided Canady, it heard a second case
raising constitutional concerns in connection with student uniforms.69 In
1995, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute authorizing school boards to
adopt rules requiring students at a school in the district to wear school
uniforms.70 Acting pursuant to this authority, and motivated by research
indicating the beneficial effects of uniforms on student learning and the
school environment, Forney ISD adopted a district-wide mandatory uni-
form policy. 71 Failure to comply with the uniform requirement would re-
sult in disciplinary action, including expulsion. Students with bona fide
religious or philosophical objections to wearing a uniform could apply for
an exemption from the requirement. 72 In order to receive the exemption,
parents were required to complete a questionnaire designed to assess the
sincerity of their beliefs. The questionnaire asked, for example, whether
the student had ever participated in any activity-such as girl scouts or
little league-that might require the student to wear a uniform.73
Seventy-two parents sought exemptions from compliance with the uni-
form policy, but only twelve exemptions were granted by the Forney
school district.74 Most students who had cited philosophical or religious
reasons as the basis for their objection were denied exemptions, because
they had worn some type of uniform in the past. Several parents and
students who were denied the exemptions filed suit.75 The students al-
leged violations of their free speech rights, while the parents alleged vio-
lations of their fundamental right to control the upbringing and education
of their children. In addition, several families alleged violations of their
freedom to exercise their religious rights. A federal district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 76
The Fifth Circuit's analysis began with the free speech claim. 77 It as-
sumed, without deciding, that the First Amendment applied to the con-
duct implicated in the uniform policy but, for several reasons, ultimately
found that the uniform policy did not violate the First Amendment. First,
the policy was adopted under the authority of state law.78 Second, it was
67. Canady, 240 F.3d at 442.
68. Id. at 444-45.
69. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
70. TEX. EDuC. CODE ANN. § 11.162 (Vernon 1996).
71. Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 279.
72. Id. at 281.
73. Id. at 281 n.4.
74. Id. at 281.
75. Id.
76. Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 286.
77. Id. at 282-84.
78. Id. at 286.
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adopted to serve important and substantial interests of the school district
and its board. 79 These interests included: improving student perform-
ance, instilling self-confidence, fostering self-esteem, increasing attend-
ance, decreasing disciplinary referrals, and lowering drop-out rates.80
Third, there was no evidence that the policy was enacted to suppress stu-
dent expression.8' Finally, the court concluded that the policy was no
more than necessary to facilitate the district's interests.8 2 The Fifth Cir-
cuit therefore affirmed the lower court's decision on the free speech
claim.83
The court next reviewed the jurisprudence interpreting parents' inter-
ests in directing the upbringing and custody of their children. 84 The par-
ents argued that mandatory school uniforms interfered with their
parental rights to teach their children to be guided by their own con-
science in making decisions, to understand the importance of appropriate
grooming and attire, and to understand and respect their own individual-
ity and the individuality of others.85 The parents also claimed that a
"strict scrutiny" analysis should apply.8 6 The court of appeals deter-
mined, however, that rational basis review was appropriate. 87 Applying
this standard, the court concluded that the uniform policy was rationally
related to the district's interest in furthering the legitimate goals of school
safety, decreasing socio-economic tensions, increasing attendance, and re-
ducing drop-out rates.88 The court thus determined that there was no
violation of the parents' Fourteenth Amendment rights.89
The court then examined the parents' religious rights claims under the
First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Finding
the school district's opt-out procedure to be a neutral and rational means
of assessing sincerity, the court determined that the process did not inter-
fere with the free exercise of religion. 90 The parents could neither estab-
lish a religious purpose behind the opt-out policy, nor prove that any
effect of the policy advanced or inhibited a particular religion. In re-
jecting the final claim, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of
the Forney school district.91 Judge Barksdale filed a concurring opinion,
bemoaning the court's avoidance of the free speech issue.92 He argued
that the court could have directly resolved the issue by holding that the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 287.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 287-88.
85. Id.
86. Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 288.
87. Id. at 289.
88. Id. at 291.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 292.
91. Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 293-95.
92. Id. at 295.
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wearing of a school uniform is not expressive conduct.93
The cases discussed above indicate a judicial tendency to defer to
school officials when student conduct, safety, or learning may be at issue.
B. EMPLOYMENT CASES
1. Sexual Harassment
Disputes between school districts and school employees continue to
provide the courts with a variety of employment-based litigation. Sexual
harassment was once again before the U.S. Supreme Court in Clark
County School District v. Breeden.94 In Breeden, the Supreme Court is-
sued a short and simple reminder to lower courts hearing sexual harass-
ment disputes: the harassment must be severe. This case arose in 1994,
when Shirley Breeden's male supervisor met with Breeden and another
male employee to review psychological evaluation reports of job appli-
cants.95 One of the applicants had once said to a co-worker: "I hear mak-
ing love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon. '96 The
supervisor read the statement aloud, looked at Breeden, and said that he
didn't know what that statement meant. The other male employee re-
sponded that he would tell the supervisor later, and both men chuckled. 97
Breeden complained about the comment to the offending employee,
two assistant superintendents, and the offending employee's supervisor.
She later filed suit, alleging that she was retaliated against for com-
plaining.98 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Breeden, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.99 The Supreme
Court stated that "[n]o reasonable person could have believed that the
single incident recounted above violated Title VII standards."' 100 Her su-
pervisor's comment was at most an isolated incident that would not sup-
port a claim for a violation of Title VII. °10 Citing its own precedent
requiring sexual harassment to be "extremely serious" in order to satisfy
Title VII, the Court determined that summary judgment in favor of the
district was appropriate. 0 2
2. Speech
While school employees have free speech rights, those rights are not
without limit. In Beattie v. Madison County School District, for example,
a middle school secretary openly supported her superintendent's oppo-
93. Id. at 295-96.
94. 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001).




99. Breeden, 121 S. Ct. at 1509.
100. Id. at 1510.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1510-11.
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nent in the election for superintendent of the school district.10 3 The su-
perintendent recommended termination of the secretary's employment,
and the school board adopted that recommendation. The secretary filed
suit, alleging she was terminated in retaliation for her expression of free
speech regarding the superintendent election. 10 4
All board members testified that they had not been aware of the secre-
tary's political activities. 0 5 The school board members also stated that
they had been neutral in the campaign for superintendent and, even with-
out the recommended action, would have terminated her employment
based on complaints about her rudeness to parents and students. Be-
cause the board established that it would have voted to terminate Beattie
regardless of the superintendent's recommendation to do so, the board
was shielded from liability for any retaliation that might have occurred.10 6
The superintendent's motives were not imputed to the board, because
the superintendent did not have final policy-making authority.10 7 The
court noted that "[t]iming alone does not create an inference that the
termination is retaliatory. 1 0 8 Because the district was able to demon-
strate legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons to support Beattie's termina-
tion, the court of appeals upheld the board's action.109
3. Leaves
Temporary disability leave has long been regarded as sacrosanct in
Texas; few school districts would dare initiate adverse employment ac-
tions against employees who had been placed on temporary disability
leave. One district's legal success, however, has demonstrated that tem-
porary disability is not an insurmountable obstacle to termination. 110 In
Nelson v. Weatherwax, the Fort Worth ISD notified a teacher by letter
that it intended to recommend termination of her contract for good
cause.')" On the same day that the letter was mailed, the teacher made a
written request for temporary disability leave.112 The school board
adopted the independent hearing examiner's recommendation to termi-
nate the contract effective upon the employee's return from temporary
disability leave. 113
The temporary disability statute, Texas Education Code section
21.409(a), states that "the contract or employment of the educator may
not be terminated by the school district while the educator is on a leave
103. 254 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2001).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 603.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 605.
108. Beattie, 254 F.3d at 605.
109. Id.
110. See Nelson v. Weatherwax, 59 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet.
denied).
111. Id. at 342.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 343.
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of absence for temporary disability.l 1 14 On appeal, both parties argued
that this language supported their interpretation of the law.'1 5 The dis-
trict argued that the teacher should not be allowed to use her temporary
disability leave offensively to preclude termination. 1 6 Relying on legisla-
tive history and the commissioner's interpretation of the statute, the court
upheld the district's decision, stating that the temporary disability statute
"prohibits only termination of a contract or of employment during an
educator's temporary disability leave. It does not prohibit the continua-
tion of an already-instituted investigation to a procedural conclusion,
short of actual termination." ' 1 7 The court explicitly declined to hold that
the temporary disability law is never violated by a district's decision to
pursue termination while an educator is on leave." 8 The court acknowl-
edged that its decision was specific to the facts at issue." 9 Nevertheless,
the decision remains helpful support for school districts with employees
who would have otherwise faced termination for good cause if not for
their temporary disability status.
C. EDUCATOR CONTRACTS
Several questions regarding nonrenewal hearings have been lingering
in the backs of school lawyers' minds for many years, such as: what is a
school board's standard in making a nonrenewal decision? Recently, a
state court of appeals provided some enlightenment in Whitaker v.
Moses.1 20 Willie G. Whitaker, an employee of Marshall ISD, contested
the nonrenewal of his contract, complaining that the board inappropri-
ately applied the substantial evidence standard to make the nonrenewal
decision. 121 Whitaker appealed to the commissioner, and the commis-
sioner agreed with Whitaker that the board's use of the substantial evi-
dence standard was improper. The commissioner, however, denied the
appeal because Whitaker had failed to object prior to the consideration
of the evidence by the board. 122 The district court affirmed the commis-
sioner's decision, and Whitaker appealed. 123
Section 21.301 of the Texas Education Code requires the commissioner
to restrict his review to evidence in the local record. 124 The code also
states that the district court must affirm the commissioner unless his deci-
sion is not supported by substantial evidence or contains erroneous con-
clusions of law. In his first point of error, Whitaker contended that the
114. TEX. Euuc. CODE ANN. § 21.409(a) (Vernon 1996).
115. Weatherwax, 59 S.W.3d at 347.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 348.
118. Id. at 348-49.
119' Id. at 349.
120. 40 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
121. Id. at 176.
122. Id. at 177-78.
123. Id. at 178.
124. Id. (citing TEX. EDUc. CooE ANN. § 21.301 (Vernon 1996)).
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district court erred in concluding that he failed to preserve error.125
Whitaker argued that only procedural errors - not substantive ones-
must be preserved. In essence, he contended that the board's application
of an improper evidentiary standard was a substantive error that he was
not required to preserve. 126 The court declined to grant this request,
however, and held that the commissioner correctly found that Whitaker
waived the issue by not raising an objection at the hearing.127 The court
reasoned that to rule otherwise would permit a party to "lay behind the
proverbial log at the hearing only to later waylay the board. The better
construction would be to require a party to create an issue for the com-
missioner's review by objecting at the board level."'1 28 Raising an objec-
tion at the hearing is, therefore, necessary to raise that issue before the
commissioner.
The court also rejected Whitaker's second point of error: that he suf-
fered a denial of his due process rights when the board applied an incor-
rect standard of proof to the evidence in his hearing.1 29 Noting that
section 21.204(e) of the Education Code clearly states that a teacher does
not have a property interest in a contract beyond its term, the court ruled
that Whitaker was not entitled to constitutional due process in the nonre-
newal of his contract.1 30
In another nonrenewal development, a Texas court of appeals has cast
doubt on a reason used by many school districts to not renew a term
contract employee.' 31 The case arose in Peaster ISD and involved two
teachers who were accused, by a former student, of having consensual
sexual relationships with that student. 132 The superintendent recom-
mended, and the school board agreed, that both teachers' contracts
should not be renewed because the former student's allegations had re-
ceived such widespread publicity that the teachers' effectiveness was ir-
reparably diminished.1 33  The commissioner upheld the district's
nonrenewal decision, but a state district court reversed in favor of the
teachers.
The school district's nonrenewal policy listed, as one of twenty-six rea-
sons for nonrenewal, "any activity, school-connected or otherwise, that,
because of the publicity given it, or knowledge of it among students,
faculty, and community, impairs or diminishes the employee's effective-
ness in the district, could result in a teacher's contract not being re-
125. Whitaker, 40 S.W.3d at 178.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 179.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Whitaker, 40 S.W.3d at 179 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.204(e) (Vernon
1996)).
131. See Peaster Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glodfelty, 63 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2001, no pet.).




newed."'1 34 The school board and the commissioner based their decisions
on an interpretation of the policy that did not require an activity of the
teachers but could be an activity of others-including one who made an
allegation about the teacher. The court rejected this theory based on its
reading of the policy: "The preestablished reason for the nonrenewal
given to Appellees was that of engaging in an "activity," not allegations
of an activity. ' 135 The school district produced no evidence of any "activ-
ity," but only of allegations, rumors, and gossip, none of which the court
considered sufficient to uphold a nonrenewal. 136 Furthermore, "fairness
dictates against holding teachers' term contracts at the mercy of nothing
more than allegations. '1 37 Even if allegations against a teacher result in
such disruption that the teacher's effectiveness is diminished, according
to this court of appeals, a nonrenewal for the reason alleged here would
require that the teacher actually have engaged in the activity that pro-
voked the disruption. 138 Any contrary interpretation would render the
teacher's ability to try to prove his or her innocence futile. 139 Thus, a
school board's belief that a teacher's effectiveness has been diminished is
an invalid basis for nonrenewal of a teaching contract unless there is ac-
tual proof that the teacher engaged in the activity which allegedly re-
sulted in the teacher's diminished effectiveness.
The developments concerning nonrenewal of educator contracts were
minor compared to those involving termination of those contracts. The
independent hearing examiner process for conducting educator termina-
tion proceedings, initially provided little guidance to school districts. Af-
ter using the system for five years, school districts now have the benefit of
judicial guidance on the intricacies of the process. 140 One of the most
frequently debated issues has been whether a school board could add to a
hearing examiner's findings of fact. In Montgomery Independent School
District v. Davis, the Texas Supreme Court considered this matter and
confirmed what many school lawyers had come to believe: a school board
cannot, as a general rule, add findings of fact to the recommendation of
an independent hearing examiner. 141
Although use of a hearing examiner is required for termination pro-
ceedings, it is optional when conducting nonrenewal hearings. Davis,
however, did involve a nonrenewal. After a five-day hearing, the hearing
examiner determined that the teacher did not fail to maintain an effective
working relationship or good rapport with parents and the community.
Nevertheless, the school board made additional fact findings, based on
the record of the hearing, and voted not to renew the teacher's contract.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Peaster, 63 S.W.3d at 10.
137. Id. at 14.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 14.
140. See, e.g., Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2000).
141. Id. at 561.
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The commissioner of education did not issue a written decision, thereby
upholding the district's decision; but the teacher appealed, and the dis-
trict court ordered that the teacher be reinstated. 142 The court of appeals
affirmed.1 43
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed the procedures set forth in the
Texas Education Code and determined that, once a school board has cho-
sen to have a hearing examiner serve as factfinder, the board's role is
limited. 144 When it chooses to delegate the factfinding role, "a board
cannot then ignore those findings with which it disagrees and substitute
its own additional findings. '145 A contrary interpretation would render
the hearing examiner process meaningless. 146 The Court did allow, how-
ever, that while an independent hearing examiner decides the facts, the
school board retains the authority to make the ultimate decision of
whether the facts demonstrate a violation of board policy. In this case,
the board's ultimate determination was based only on its additional fact
findings. Because that fact finding was unauthorized, the board's nonre-
newal decision could not stand.147 With Davis, the Texas Supreme Court
has thus filled a void in the Education Code: school boards may not add
fact findings to the recommendations of hearing examiners.
Although school boards may not add to a hearing examiner's recom-
mendations, they may make changes to them, within certain boundaries.
Houston ISD accomplished this in Miller v. Houston Independent School
District.148 Marsha Miller was employed under a continuing contract by
Houston ISD for twenty-eight years. 149 After she was transferred to a
different high school, she became dissatisfied with her commute and did
not report to work for approximately three months. She eventually re-
ported to work, but shortly thereafter, the board notified Miller that it
intended to terminate her contract for her repeated failure to comply
with district directives and her neglect of her duties.150 An independent
hearing examiner determined that good cause did not exist to terminate
Miller's contract and recommended that she be reinstated without back
pay for the three-month absence. The board adopted some of the hearing
examiner's findings of fact but made numerous changes to the recom-
mendation and, rather than reinstating her, voted to terminate Miller's
contract. The commissioner, the trial court, and the court of appeals up-
held the board's decision. 151
Miller raised several objections, the strongest of which was her argu-
ment that the commissioner erred in upholding the board's modification
142. Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 561.
143. Id at 561-62.
144. Id. at 564.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 568.
148. 51 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
149. Id. at 678.




of the hearing examiner's recommendation, because the board had no
authority to add a dispositive factfinding. 152 The court held, however,
that the board did not add a finding: the hearing examiner had stated in
his recommendation that Miller had failed to return to work.153 Where
this statement appeared in the hearing examiner's recommendation was
of no consequence, wherever it was placed, it was a factfinding. Further,
there was no dispute that Miller did not work for almost three months.
154
Citing the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery Independent
School District v. Davis,155 the court observed that a board may always
rely on undisputed evidence. 156 In this case, therefore, the board could
rely on this fact to support its conclusion that good cause existed to termi-
nate Miller's contract. 157
The court's analysis of Miller's arguments regarding the board's modifi-
cations of the hearing examiner's recommendation may guide attorneys
in litigating similar matters. For example, the board rejected the finding
that it is possible for an employee to be assigned to her home during the
grievance process as not supported by substantial evidence. Whether it
was a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, the finding merely reflected
district policy.' 58 Miller also complained that the board had redesignated
and modified a finding of fact describing the grievance process as a legal
conclusion. 159 The court held that any error was harmless, because the
finding was one regarding HISD's general policy; it had nothing to do
with whether Miller was ever assigned to her home while proceeding with
her grievance.' 60
Finally, Miller claimed that the commissioner erred in upholding the
board's rejection or modification of two of the hearing examiner's legal
conclusions. 161 Each of the hearing examiner's conclusions stated that
the district had failed to prove good cause for discharge, but the board
changed one conclusion to state that good cause had been proved. The
commissioner determined that these conclusions were actually ultimate
fact findings that could be rejected because they were not supported by
substantial evidence. Miller argued that the commissioner erred in con-
cluding that substantial evidence did not support the ultimate fact find-
ings, but the court determined that the commissioner had not erred since
Miller did not report to work for almost three months, despite being in-
structed to do so. 1 62 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
152. Id. at 682.
153. Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 683.
154. Id.
155. 34 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2000).
156. Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 683.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 684.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 685.
162. Id. at 686.
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court's decision in favor of the board. 163
A third decision involving educator contracts was one of the early ap-
peals to reach the commissioner after the hearing examiner process was
added to state law in 1995.164 The Houston Independent School District
proposed to terminate Beverly Goodie's contract for failure to comply
with directives and policies regarding punishment, failure to comply with
attendance policies, and failure to comply with professional growth re-
quirements. 165 After a four-day hearing, an independent hearing exam-
iner recommended that Goodie not be terminated. The school board
rejected the independent hearing examiner's conclusions of law, and in-
stead accepted the administration's proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law in deciding to terminate Goodie's contract. 166 Three days
later, the board president sent a letter to Goodie, outlining the results of
the board's vote and announcing why the board had changed one of the
examiner's findings of fact and rejected another. 167 This letter did not,
however, state a reason and legal basis-as required by the Education
Code-for any of the board's changes to the hearing examiner's recom-
mendation.168 After Goodie appealed to the commissioner, the board
president sent Goodie a second letter stating that the reasons for the de-
cision were outlined in the hearing transcript. 16 9
The commissioner found: (1) that the board had no authority to modify
the hearing examiner's findings of fact or to add additional findings of
fact; (2) that the conclusions of law were not supported by substantial
evidence; and (3) that the board had failed to state a reason for modifying
the hearing examiner's findings and conclusions. 170 The trial court re-
versed the commissioner's ruling,171 but the court of appeals reversed
again in favor of Goodie. 172
The court of appeals focused on a provision in the Texas Education
Code, section 21.259(d), which requires that a school board "state in writ-
ing the reason and legal basis for a change or rejection" of a hearing
examiner's proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law.173 Substantial
evidence supported the commissioner's conclusion that the two letters
sent from the school district to Goodie did not satisfy this condition.174
The court determined that the first letter did not state a reason or a legal
basis for making changes to the hearing examiner's recommendation.
163. Id.
164. See Goodie v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 57 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
165. Id. 647-48.
166. Id. at 649.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.259 (Vernon 1986)).
169. Goodie, 57 S.W.3d at 649.
170. Id. at 649-50.
171. Id. at 650.
172. Id. at 647.
173. Id. at 651 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.259(d) (Vernon 1986)).
174. Goodie, 57 S.W.3d at 651.
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The first letter was, therefore, inadequate under Education Code section
21.259(d).175 Moreover, the second letter was simply a letter from the
board president; it was not "sanctioned by the Board."'1 76 Contrary to the
district's assertions, these errors were not merely procedural. Because
the school district failed to comply with the statutory requirements, the
court of appeals affirmed the commissioner's order that the school dis-
trict reinstate Goodie and pay her back wages and benefits.' 77
One member of the three-judge panel dissented, noting that the record
clearly indicated that, despite directives and warnings, Goodie was tardy
89 times in less than a two-year period. 178 Although the hearing exam-
iner determined that Goodie's repeated tardiness did not constitute good
cause for termination, the dissenting judge argued that the school board
was not required to accept this conclusion, nor could it have given much
more of an explanation than the statement it made: "Ms. Goodie's re-
peated failure to follow directives regarding attendance is good cause for
her termination."' 179 The board, the dissent pointed out, retains the au-
thority to determine whether board policy was violated. 80
D. PROCEDURAL LESSONS
Courts offered school attorneys some important procedural lessons in
areas such as standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and juris-
diction of the commissioner of education. The Texas Supreme Court is-
sued a significant decision in Bland Independent School District v.
Blue.181 Bland ISD had contracted for the construction of a new high
school using a pre-engineered metal building. The total cost of the pro-
ject was $1,390,000, of which $1,050,000 was financed through a lease-
purchase agreement with Citicorp.' 82 The new building opened in Au-
gust 1997, at which time the school district began making payments on
the lease-purchase contract from state funds and local tax revenues.
In 1998, two taxpayers sued the district, seeking to enjoin it from mak-
ing payments to Citicorp under the lease-purchase agreement. 183 They
alleged that the contract with Citicorp was illegal because it was made
without complying with the Public Property Finance Act in Chapter 271
of the Texas Local Government Code. The school district filed a plea to
the jurisdiction, asserting that the Blues did not have standing to sue, as
they could not show any particularized injury separate and apart from
that of the general public.' 84 A state district court ruled that the Blues
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 652.
178. Id. (J., dissenting).
179. Goodie, 57 S.W.3d at 652.
180. Id. at 653 (citing Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tex.
2000)).
181. 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000).
182. Id. at 549.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 550.
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had standing to challenge the Citicorp agreement insofar as it provided
financing for the building itself and work done on it, and not to financing
for furnishings in the building that were clearly personal property.18 5 The
jurisdictional decision was based on the pleadings, not on iny evidence
introduced by the school district that revealed the status of the project or
the source of the funds used to pay Citicorp.186 A court of appeals con-
cluded that the trial court had ruled properly on Bland ISD's plea to the
jurisdiction, and the school district appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court. 18
7
The supreme court reviewed its own precedent regarding taxpayer
standing, noting that the "jurisprudential justification for taxpayer suits to
enjoin performance of illegal agreements is that the interference such
suits pose to government activities is slight in comparison to the protec-
tion afforded taxpayers from preventing the culmination of illegal agree-
ments made by public officials."' 188 But in cases such as this, the court
determined, justification is much less compelling. "When all that remains
is a school district's repayment of a loan for work completed," it held,
"allowance of a taxpayer action to prohibit such repayment threatens a
substantial interference with governmental actions. ' 189 The court ob-
served that if the Blues were to proceed with their suit and actually pre-
vail on their actions, they would disrupt not only the district's already
substantial investment in the high school but would also increase the risk
to lenders and others that deal with governmental entities. 190 The poten-
tial for disruption was too great to allow a taxpayer with no particular
interest distinct from the general public's to sue and perhaps prohibit the
government from paying for goods and services it has already received
and placed in use. 191  4
One particularly hot issue of late was the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine. Several courts ruled that former employees were not
required to exhaust administrative remedies, but not all former employ-
ees succeeded without fulfilling the requirement. In Wilmer-Hutchins In-
dependent School District v. Sullivan, the Texas Supreme Court found no
jurisdiction over an appeal due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust reme-
dies. 192 As part of a reduction in force, Wilmer-Hutchins ISD terminated
the employment of a custodian who had returned to work after a work-
ers' compensation injury.' 93 The employee complained to the school dis-
trict's attorney that the district had retaliated against her because she had
filed a workers' compensation claim. The attorney informed the em-
185. Id.
186. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 550.
187. Id. at 558.
188. Id. at 557-58.
189. Id. at 558.
190. Id.
191. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 558.
192. 51 S.W.3d 293, 293 (Tex. 2001).
193. Id.
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ployee that she could not advise her. 194 The attorney did not inform the
employee of the district's grievance procedures or suggest that the em-
ployee seek legal counsel. The employee filed suit without first filing a
grievance. 195
The trial court dismissed the claim based on the employee's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. 196 The court of appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that the employee's allegation that she had exhausted
her administrative remedies was conclusive because the district had not
alleged that the pleading was fraudulent. 197 The Texas Supreme Court
again reversed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 198
The employee argued that the district should be estopped from arguing
that the court lacks jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative rem-
edies, because the district misled her about those remedies. 199 The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that jurisdiction cannot be conferred
by a party's conduct if the jurisdiction did not otherwise exist.200 The
undisputed evidence showed that the employee had not exhausted ad-
ministrative remedies and, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over
the claim.201
By contrast, in Mission Consolidated Independent School District v.
Flores, the plaintiff was not required to exhaust his available remedies. 20 2
Efren Flores was employed by Mission ISD as a bus driver until he sus-
tained an on-the-job injury to his knee.20 3 He received workers' compen-
sation benefits for this injury and returned to work on modified duty for a
short time before undergoing knee surgery.204 Following the surgery, he
was again released for modified duty, but the district did not reinstate
him because it did not have any available positions. Flores contended
that this reason was pretextual and that he was discharged in retaliation
for filing a workers' compensation claim.205 Accordingly, Flores filed suit
against the school district.
The trial court rejected Mission ISD's pre-trial plea to the jurisdic-
tion.206 The court of appeals, agreeing with Flores, found that there was
no administrative process under which he could pursue his claims of retal-
iation and wrongful discharge. 20 7 Flores could, therefore, go straight to
court without having to first file a grievance. 208
194. Id.
195. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d at 293-94.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 293-94.
198. Id. at 294-95.
199. Id. at 294.
200. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d at 294.
201. Id. at 295.
202. 39 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
203. Id. at 675.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 676.
206. Id. at 675.
207. Flores, 39 S.W.3d at 676.
208. Id. at 677-78.
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An important decision regarding the handling of grievance appeals was
Grigsby v. Moses.209 In this case, a tennis coach at Granbury High School
whose coaching duties extended over two semesters believed she was en-
titled to two stipends for performing these duties.210 Like most Texas
school districts, Granbury ISD requires employees to file a complaint
within 15 days of the time he or she knows or should have known of the
event or series of events causing the complaint. Pursuant to this policy,
the coach filed a grievance with her principal.211 The principal denied the
grievance on the basis that it was not filed in a timely manner under
board policy. The superintendent and the school board each denied her
appeal on the same grounds. 212 The commissioner of education and a
state district court upheld the school district's decision.2 13
On appeal, Grigsby contended that the district court erred, because the
school district had waived the fifteen-day requirement by allowing a
grievance presentation at the board meeting.2 14 Citing its own precedent,
the Third Court of Appeals explained that a school district waives its
right to assert a time limitation by granting and conducting a hearing on
an employee's complaint.2 15 Grigsby argued that the school board relin-
quished its right to insist upon a time limit by merely listening to her
complaint. The transcript of the board meeting indicated that the board
listened to Grigsby's complaint, accepted documents in support of her
argument, but took no action on her complaint, thereby upholding the
superintendent's decision to deny the complaint on the basis of untimely
filing.216 This record did not convince the court of appeals that the board
had waived the 15-day time limitation; the court upheld the trial court's
decision in favor of the school district.217
The Third Court of Appeals issued an important decision regarding the
jurisdiction of the commissioner of education in Smith v. Nelson.218 The
case arose in Zapata County ISD, which employed Pete Smith as Athletic
Coordinator/Head Football Coach under a multi-year term contract be-
ginning in 1997.219 The contract included a reassignment provision pursu-
ant to which the district reassigned Smith, with no change in pay, to the
position of elementary school physical education teacher in October
1997. Smith's grievance regarding the reassignment was denied at all
levels. 220 Smith then appealed to the commissioner, arguing that his reas-
signment would cause monetary harm because he would not be able to
209. 31 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).




214. Grigsby 31 S.W. 3d at 749.
215. Id. (citing Havner v. Meno, 867 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ);
Hernandez v. Meno, 828 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 53 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied).
219. Id. at 793.
220. Id. at 793-94.
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obtain future employment as a football coach or athletic director for a
comparable salary.221
Section 7.057 of the Texas Education Code gives the commissioner of
education jurisdiction to hear an appeal of someone who is aggrieved by:
(1) the school laws of this state; (2) actions or decisions of a board of
trustees that violate the school laws of the state; or (3) actions or deci-
sions of a board of trustees that violate the provisions of a written em-
ployment contract between the district and an employee, if the violation
causes or would cause monetary harm to the employee. 222 The only mon-
etary harm Smith alleged was a loss of future earning capacity, which was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the commissioner. The district court
affirmed that decision.223 The court of appeals initially reversed, but on
its own motion, withdrew that opinion, affirming the decisions below.
224
The court of appeals ultimately concluded that the commissioner had
construed section 7.057 of the Texas Education Code correctly. 225 "To
appeal to the Commissioner under section 7.057," the court held, "a
teacher must allege that he has suffered or will suffer monetary harm in
the context of the contract that has been violated, not that he may suffer
harm from contracts that he may or may not secure in the future. '226 In
so holding, the court noted that in revising section 7.057, the legislature
intended to limit the number of grievances the commissioner could
hear.22 7
E. IMMUNITY
Several interesting questions concerning both personal and govern-
mental immunity were taken to the courts this past year. Of the cases
discussed here, two provide reassurance, 228 while two raise concerns re-
garding the scope of immunity provided to public schools and their pro-
fessional employees. 229
"The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its longstanding position
on corporal punishment in Moore v. Willis Independent School District.
230
In this case, a student's gym teacher ordered him to perform 100 "up-
downs" for violating a class rule by talking during roll call.231 After he
did the "up-downs," the student participated in 20-25 minutes of weight-
lifting. In the following days, he was diagnosed with a degenerative dis-
221. Id. at 794.
222. Id. (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057 (Vernon 1986)).
223. Smith, 53 S.W.3d at 793.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 795.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 796.
228. See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000); Deaver v.
Bridges, 47 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
229. See Myers v. Doe, 52 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed); Austin
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gutierrez, 54 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. filed).
230. 233 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).
231. Id. at 873.
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ease of the skeletal muscle and renal failure, for which he was hospital-
ized and missed three weeks of school. The student's parents filed suit
against the district and the teacher, alleging a federal due process viola-
tion along with state law claims.232
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that inflicting pain
through unreasonably excessive exercise violates a student's constitu-
tional right to bodily integrity, but that this right is not implicated in a
case involving an allegation of corporal punishment intended as a discipli-
nary measure. 233 State law, the court explained, provides "adequate
traditional common-law remedies for students who have been subjected
to disciplinary force," and therefore, the parents could not proceed with
their federal due process claims.234 In so holding, the court noted that
this had been its consistent approach since it initially analyzed the Texas
corporal punishment system in Fee v. Herndon.235 In a specially concur-
ring opinion, Judge Weiner expressed his concern that the Fee court had
"placed too much reliance on the mere existence of putative state-law
remedies when we answered in the negative the question 'whether the
federal Constitution independently shields public school students from
excessive discipline.' 236 Noting that no other circuit court has followed
the Fifth Circuit's lead on this determination, Judge Weiner suggested
that the court, sitting en banc, reconsider its position.237 Until then, cor-
poral punishment will not support federal due process claims in Texas.
Deaver v. Bridges is an important state case that should provide reas-
surance to many school employees. 238 Educators are continuously gun-
shy about providing references with details about former employees' con-
duct, especially if employees were suspected of, or proven to have en-
gaged in, misconduct. In Deaver, the Menard ISD recommended a
teacher for termination based on allegations that she made a racially de-
rogatory comment about a public school student.239 An independent
hearing examiner found that the proposed termination was arbitrary, ca-
pricious, and not supported by the evidence. 240 The parties then entered
into a settlement agreement, which stated that the superintendent would
provide only minimal information about the teacher's employment, such
as dates of employment, the capacity in which she served, the fact that
she resigned, and a copy of an agreed-upon reference letter.241
The day after the settlement agreement was signed, the superintendent
had a telephone conversation with a newspaper reporter, who subse-
232. Id.
233. Id. at 875.
234. Id. at 875-76.
235. Moore, 233 F.3d at 875 (citing Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990)).
236. Id. at 879.
237. Id. at 880.
238. 47 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
239. Id. at 551.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 551-52.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
quently printed an article indicating that the teacher had resigned amidst
findings that she had used a racial epithet against a student.2 42 The for-
mer teacher sued the district and the superintendent for defamation. The
superintendent claimed immunity under section 22.051 of the Texas Edu-
cation Code.243 The trial court denied him immunity, but the court of
appeals reversed.2 44
The Texas Education Code provides immunity to educators who are
professional employees, acting within the scope of or incident to duties
that involve the exercise of judgment or discretion. 245 In Deaver, the
teacher argued that making false, defamatory statements to the media
was not part of the regular duties of a superintendent and could not be
interpreted as advancing the legitimate function of superintendents or
their districts.2 46 The teacher further claimed that the settlement agree-
ment clearly delineated the superintendent's duties, and therefore, his
speaking to the media could not have been a discretionary action that
would allow for immunity. The superintendent responded that he under-
stood the settlement agreement to restrict the information that he would
provide in response to a prospective employment inquiry-not to other
inquiries. 247 Because he was not provided with any guidance on how to
interpret the agreement and did not have any prepared statement to use
at media interviews, the superintendent argued that he used his discretion
and judgment in formulating responses to the reporter's questions. 248
The court of appeals determined that neither the individual response to
the media, nor the interpretation of the agreement should determine
whether the superintendent was exercising a discretionary or ministerial
function.2 49 Instead, the court reviewed the overall responsibilities of a
superintendent to determine whether personal deliberation and judgment
were exercised. The court found that, like maintaining discipline, inter-
preting contracts and communicating with the media required the exer-
cise of judgment and personal deliberation. 250 Consequently, it granted
the superintendent immunity from the teacher's defamation claim.251
In Myers v. Doe, the Forth Worth court of appeals hinted that the exis-
tence of specific procedures could preclude a finding of immunity by re-
moving any discretionary duties from educators.252 In Myers, a 17-year-
old special education student with the IQ of a six to eight year-old child
was involved in a sexual encounter with another special education stu-
242. Id. at 552.
243. Deaver, 47 S.W.3d at 552 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.051 (Vernon 1996)).
244. Id. at 550.
245. TEX. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 22.051 (Vernon 1996).
246. Deaver, 47 S.W.3d at 554.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 556.
250. Id.
251. Deaver, 47 S.W.3d at 556.
252. 52 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. filed).
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dent named "Mad Dog. ' 253 The diagnostician in charge of disciplining
special education students discussed the issue with the girl and deter-
mined that the sex had been consensual.254 Both students were then dis-
ciplined with a reprimand. The next day, the female student told one of
her teachers that the sex was not consensual, and the teacher wrote a
memo advising the diagnostician, vice-principal, principal, and the super-
intendent of this finding.255 In response, the school officials decided to
adopt some new procedures, such as not allowing the two students to be
left alone together and to have them accompanied and watched by an
escort. However, these procedures were never implemented, and the girl
was assaulted in the elevator twice more. The girl's parents then filed
suit, alleging that the school officials' failure to perform ministerial acts
and failure to properly discipline "Mad Dog" led to their daughter's
injuries.256
The officials sought immunity under the Education Code.257 The court
focused on whether the officials' actions involved the exercise of judg-
ment or discretion, explaining that the determination depended upon the
ability of the actor to exercise discretion when performing the act. "If a
policy prescribes the duties to be performed with such precision and cer-
tainty so as to leave nothing to the exercise of the actor's judgment," the
court stated, "then the act is ministerial. ' 258 Here, the officials drafted
specific policies and procedures regarding the two students involved in
the incident.259 The proposed policies defined the employees' duties with
such precision that there was no room for discretion, but the policies were
never implemented. Although the court seemed inclined to conclude that
the duties involved were ministerial, it declined to make a final determi-
nation without a trial.260
The motor vehicle exception to the Texas Tort Claims Act came under
scrutiny in Austin Independent School District v. Gutierrez.261 The case
arose when a young girl in the Austin ISD got off her school bus one day,
crossed the street, and was killed when a drunk driver hit her.262 Her
parents sued the district, alleging that the Austin ISD bus driver had
honked the bus horn as a signal to the disembarked children that it was
safe to cross the street. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, a school dis-
trict can be liable only for claims arising from the "use or operation" of a
motor vehicle.2 63 The district filed a plea to the jurisdiction, claiming that
253. Id. at 393.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 394.
256. Id.
257. Deaver, 47 S.W.3d at 394 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.051(a) (Vernon
1996)).
258. Id. at 396.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 397-98.
261. 54 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. filed).
262. Id. at 861.
263. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1)(a) (Vernon 1997).
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it was immune from suit and that the bus driver's actions had not waived
that immunity.264 The district court denied the plea to the jurisdiction,
and the Austin ISD filed an interlocutory appeal. The school district was
unable, however, to meet the burden of showing that the factual allega-
tions in the petition did not, as a matter of law, constitute the use or
operation of a motor vehicle. 265 In distinguishing the cases cited by the
district, the court emphasized that the school bus was present at the scene
of the accident and the bus driver took the affirmative action of honking
the horn.266 The final resolution of this case will be an important one.
F. GOVERNANCE-THE TPIA AND TOMA
Most of the guidance regarding the open government laws 267 is pro-
vided by the Texas attorney general, but in the past year, the courts have
had the opportunity to address these laws. Three different courts of ap-
peals were presented with Open Meetings Act challenges, all involving
the notice requirements of the act.268
In Hill v. Palestine Independent School District, a former teacher al-
leged that his nonrenewal hearing was invalid and void under the Open
Meetings Act because the hearing had not been placed on the agenda for
the meeting.269 Both the teacher and his attorney appeared for the hear-
ing, but the school board took no action on the night of the hearing. Two
weeks later, the board held another meeting, at which it voted to termi-
nate the teacher's employment with the district.270
The court of appeals noted that the Open Meetings Act distinguishes
between meetings at which deliberation occurs and meetings at which ac-
tion is taken.271 It also noted that its precedent had held that action
taken at a meeting for which insufficient notice is given is voidable, but
the meeting itself is not voidable.272 Although the district did not give
proper public notice of the teacher's nonrenewal hearing, it did provide
proper notice prior to the meeting at which it voted to terminate the
teacher's employment.273 The court rejected the employee's argument
that his contract automatically renewed the day after his nonrenewal
hearing was held, based on its conclusion that the meeting at which the
hearing occurred was not invalid.274 The school district gave proper no-
264. Id. at 861-62.
265. Id. at 866.
266. Gutierrez, 54 S.W.3d at 866-67.
267. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 551 (TOMA), 552 (TPIA) (Vernon 1994).
268. See Hill v. Palestine Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 12-00-00101-CV, 2000 WL 1737531, at
*1 (Tex. App.-Iler Nov. 22, 2000, pet. denied); Hays County Water Planning P'ship v.
Hays County, 41 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied); Salazar v. Gallardo, 57
S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
269. No. 12-00-00101-CV, 2000 WL 1737531, at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied)
(unpublished opinion).
270. Id.
271. Id. at *2.
272. Id.
273. Id. at *3.
274. Hill, 2000 WL 1737531, at *3.
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tice of its intention to consider the nonrenewal of the teacher and voted
in open session on that issue. Therefore, it was not "the type of govern-
mental action that is subject to judicial invalidation. ' 275
The second case involved the notice required when a governmental en-
tity has knowledge of the topic on which someone will be making public
comments. 276 In Hays County Water Planning Partnership v. Hays
County, the agenda for the Hays County Commissioner's Court meeting
held on October 26, 1999 listed a discussion item as "Presentation by
Commissioner Russ Molenaar. ' '277 At the meeting, Molenaar made some
of his suggestions for road development, water service, and county em-
ployment matters. No questions were asked of Molenaar, and no action
was taken regarding the issues he raised.278 A group of Hays County
residents sued the county for violations of the Open Meetings Act. The
residents appealed a ruling in favor of the county.279
As an initial matter, the court of appeals found that the residents had
standing to bring this action under the standard for associational standing
set forth in Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board.2s0
The court next addressed the Open Meetings Act issues, paying particular
attention to the notice requirements. 281 The court found "Presentation"
to be a vague description. There was nothing in the posting that would
give a resident of Hays County any idea of the substance of Molenaar's
proposed presentation.28 2 The court accorded particular weight to a 2000
opinion of the attorney general, in which the attorney general advised
that "public comment" would not be sufficient notice if the governmental
body was aware or reasonably should have known of the subjects to be
mentioned. 28 3 As the commissioner's court was "surely aware" of the
contents of Molenaar's presentation before the meeting agenda was pre-
pared, the court held that the notice the county provided was
insufficient.284
The county argued unsuccessfully that Molenaar's presentation was ex-
empt from the Open Meeting Act's notice requirements by section
551.042 of the Texas Government Code, which allows a governmental
body to make a very limited response to a public comment.28 5 But be-
cause Molenaar was not responding to an inquiry by a member of the
court or the public, the exception of section 551.042 did not apply.28 6
275. Id.
276. See Hays County Water Planning P'ship v. Hays County, 41 S.W.3d 174 (Tex.
App.-Austin, 2001, pet. denied).
277. Id. at 176.
278. Id. at 179.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 178 (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 447
(Tex. 1993)).
281. Hays County, 47 S.W.3d at 179.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0169 (2000)).
284. Id. at 181.
285. Id.
286. Hays County, 41 S.W.3d at 181.
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Finally, the court rejected the county's argument that Molenaar's right
to free speech could not be abridged by state law.287 "The problem with
Molenaar's remarks," the court stated, "is not that he could not make
them at all, but rather the location and timing of his comments was lim-
ited."'288 The court held that requiring compliance with the Open Meet-
ings Act does not violate the First Amendment. 289
The third case included under this heading is Salazar v. Gallardo.290
Salazar involved the notice of a meeting at which a school board voted to
accept the superintendent's resignation and pay her severance of
$500,000.291 Two taxpayers filed suit to void the transaction, alleging that
the agenda posted for the meeting was inadequate to inform the public of
the issue to be voted on by the school board. A trial court signed a tem-
porary injunction ordering the former superintendent to deposit the
money she had thus far received with the court, and enjoined the district
from making additional payments to her.292 The court based this action
on its determination that the meeting at issue probably violated the Texas
Open Meetings Act. The superintendent and the school district filed an
interlocutory appeal. 293
The court of appeals reviewed the temporary injunction for an abuse of
discretion. 294 The agenda for the meeting had stated that the board
would discuss "the superintendent's performance, job duties, evaluation
and contract. '295 The superintendent and the president of the school
board testified that they would discuss the superintendent's problems in
performing her duties, and four trustees testified that they did not antici-
pate that a buy-out of the superintendent's contract would result. 296
The superintendent argued that the notice need not list all possible
consequences or outcomes of topics listed on the agenda, but the court of
appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had a probable right of recovery.297
Furthermore, the court determined that the injunction ordering the su-
perintendent to deposit the money she had received from the school dis-
trict preserved the status quo, i.e., the status quo that preceded the
controversy. 298
Although the individual trustees had not been named as defendants,
the court of appeals found this omission inconsequential, since, in naming
the school district as a party, the board had been effectively included in
287. Id. at 181-82.
288. Id. at 182.
289. Id.
290. 57 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
291. Id. at 631.
292. Id. at 632.
293. Id. at 631.
294. Id. at 632.
295. Salazar, 57 S.W.3d at 633.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 634.
298. Id.
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the proceedings.299 Similarly, the court rejected Salazar's claim that she
could not be subject to the injunction, since she was not a member of the
board.300 The Texas Open Meetings Act gives authority to enjoin actions
of the board; as an agent of the board, she could properly be subject to
the injunction.30 1
With regard to the Texas Public Information Act, perhaps the most im-
portant decision was handed down by the Texas Supreme Court in In re
the City of Georgetown.30 2 In this case, the trial court's decision virtually
eviscerated the attorney-client privilege of governmental entities. Fortu-
nately, the supreme court restored the integrity of this exception. The
case involved the City of Georgetown, which had hired an engineer as a
consulting expert to prepare a report assessing one of the city's waste-
water treatment plants for use in pending and anticipated litigation con-
cerning the plant.303 The report was, in fact, used in connection with the
litigation. The city manager also attached a copy of the consulting ex-
pert's report to the manager's self-evaluation, which he provided to city
council members.30 4 While litigation about the wastewater treatment
plant was proceeding, a newspaper requested that the city release the
evaluation and attached documentation. The city, believing the report to
be exempt from disclosure as information related to litigation under the
Texas Government Code section 552.103(a), sought a ruling from the At-
torney General. 30 5 The Attorney General agreed that the report was pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation. Nevertheless, he concluded that the
report had to be released because it was a completed report-one of the
items expressly made public by the definition of public information in
section 552.022-and it was not expressly made confidential by "other
law," as required by statute.30 6
The city sought a declaratory judgment that it was not required to dis-
close the report.30 7 Seeking to compel disclosure, the newspaper inter-
vened in the suit and the trial court ordered the city to disclose the
report.308 The city appealed, and after the court of appeals denied its
petition for a writ of mandamus, the city petitioned the Texas Supreme
Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its
order. 309
The newspaper argued that the city's report was a completed report
and had to be disclosed because no other law expressly made a consulting
299. Id. at 635.
300. Salazar, 57 S.W.3d at 635.
301. Id. at 635-36.
302. 53 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. 2001).
303. Id. at 329.
304. Id.
305. Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.103(a) (Vernon 1994)).
306. Id. at 329-30 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. 552.022 (Vernon 1994)).




expert's report confidential.310 The city contended that the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure were "other law" that made consulting expert reports
confidential. 311 The Texas Supreme Court considered the term "other
law" and determined that its meaning was not limited to statutes.312 Not-
ing that attorney work product and attorney-client privileges have long
been a part of the common law and that the legislature was fully aware of
these privileges when it amended the statute in 1999, the court held that
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were "other law," and consulting-ex-
pert reports were within a category of information that was expressly con-
fidential under those rules. 313
The court also observed that the interpretation of section 552.022 advo-
cated by the newspaper would have "a profound impact" on the ability of
governmental bodies to seek legal advice. 314 Recognizing that this inter-
pretation would mean that written legal advice and strategy provided to
governmental bodies would have to be disclosed upon request to oppos-
ing parties, the court observed that taxpayers would bear increased costs
due to the resulting disadvantages to governmental bodies engaged in liti-
gation. 315 The court conditionally issued a writ of mandamus directing
the trial court to vacate the order in which it required the city to produce
records to the newspaper.316
In the past year, two Texas courts of appeals have issued TPIA rulings
specific to school districts. The first case involved employee surveys. 317
As part of its site-based decision-making process, Arlington ISD annually
surveyed the professional and paraprofessional staff at each campus for
their opinions on the learning environment and student performance. 318
The superintendent assured the survey respondents that their answers
would remain anonymous. In 1998 and 1999, a local newspaper sent Ar-
lington ISD public information requests for the survey results, including
all written comments garnered from the survey.3t 9 The school district, in
turn, requested open records decisions from the attorney general, assert-
ing that the requested information fell within the "agency memoranda"
exception to the Public Information Act. The attorney general advised
the district that it could withhold narrative comments but that the com-
piled results-bar graphs and aggregate percentages of responses for
each answer-had to be disclosed.320 The school district filed suit after
both rulings, seeking declaratory judgments that the survey results need
310. Id.
311. Id. at 331.
312. Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d at 332.
313. Id. at 332-33.
314. Id. at 333 (citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.002 (Vernon 1994)).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 337.
317. Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Att'y Gen., 37 S.W.3d 152, 155-56 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2001, no pet.).
318. Id. at 155.




not be disclosed.321 The lawsuits were consolidated, and both parties
filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the attor-
ney general's motion, and the school district appealed to the Third Court
of Appeals.322
The attorney general contended that the survey results represented fac-
tual material that was not deliberative and did not fall within the agency
memoranda exception to the Public Information Act.323 The court of ap-
peals agreed with the attorney general's position, finding that it struck
"the proper balance between the public's right to governmental informa-
tion and the entity's ability to conduct its affairs. '324 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court reasoned that the survey results were the "raw data
upon which decisions can be made" but were "not themselves a part of
the decisional process. '325 The surveys did not relate to the making of
new policy. Instead, they allowed the district to measure its performance
under existing policy. 326 Thus, the court concluded that the survey results
were not predecisional, intra-agency memoranda related to policymak-
ing.327 It held that the agency memoranda exception to the Public Infor-
mation Act did not encompass the survey results.328 The court affirmed
the judgment in favor of the attorney general, requiring the district to
make public the survey results.329
Fish v. Dallas Independent School District, yet another TPIA decision,
involved the disclosure of student information. 330 Student information is,
of course, protected by federal law to a certain extent, but summaries and
statistical information about students are often subject to disclosure
under the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA). 331 In this case, Russell
Fish and the Dallas NAACP sought a writ of mandamus against the Dal-
las ISD to obtain standardized testing results under the Public Informa-
tion Act.332 Specifically, they sought certain information from the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills for the 1986-1997 school years, including: student
number; student sex, age, and ethnicity; special education and LEP flags;
campus name; grade; and reading and math grade equivalents. They also
requested that a "unique number be placed in the field for student and
teacher names and that the number be consistent from year to year. '333
Dallas ISD moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not re-
quired to disclose confidential information or personally identifiable in-
formation contained in education records, nor was it required to create
321. Id.
322. Arlington, 37 S.W.3d at 156.
323. Id. at 157.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 161.
326. Id. at 160-61.
327. Arlington, 37 S.W.3d at 161.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 163.
330. 31 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, no pet.).
331. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.001 et seq. (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2000).




new information, such as identification numbers, in response to requests
for public information. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and entered a take-nothing summary judgment in
favor of the school district.334
The court of appeals reviewed both reasons asserted by Dallas ISD for
withholding the information. It noted that the Family Education Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects, with certain exceptions, the confiden-
tiality of student education records. 335 None of the exceptions applied
here, but the court of appeals nonetheless determined that the informa-
tion requested was not made confidential by FERPA.336 The district pro-
vided no evidence to support its argument that it could not maintain the
integrity of the statistical information released, and state law authorizes
release of aggregated student data that does not contain the names of
individual teachers or students.337
Dallas ISD also asserted that assigning a unique and confidential nu-
merical code to each student and teacher would require the district to
create new information, which is not required by the TPIA.338 The plain-
tiffs argued that their request merely required a manipulation or pro-
gramming of data. The court of appeals agreed with the plaintiffs, finding
that, "[a]ccording to the plaintiffs' summary judgment evidence, substi-
tuting each child's name with a unique, confidential number would have
required a mere manipulation of the existing data by adding only one line
of programming code."'339 The court of appeals thus held that the request
required the manipulation of data, not the creation of new
information. 340
The plaintiffs requested that the court order the immediate production
of the requested information. 341 The court refused to do so because of
confidentiality concerns.342 In the court's opinion, the plaintiffs failed to
conclusively show that the student's confidentiality would not be compro-
mised by the disclosure of the information as requested. Consequently,
the court ruled that the trial court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment. 343 Summary judgment in favor of the district
was, however, improper, and therefore, the court reversed and remanded
the case for further proceedings. 344
334. Id.
335. Id. at 680-81 (citing Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974
§§ 552.026, 552.114, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(b) (West 2000)).
336. Id. at 681.
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G. CONSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL LAW ISSUES
On the constitutional front, the most important developments involved
facilities use policies, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Good News Club v. Milford Central School.34 5 This case involved a
very common scenario, since many school districts open their facilities for
use by outside groups and have fairly liberal access policies. Various cir-
cuit courts of appeals had issued different interpretations of school dis-
tricts' ability to limit the types of groups that might use their facilities,
and in Good News, the Supreme Court finally weighed in. The challenge
was brought by a religious club-the Good News Club-after its request
to use the school's facilities was denied.
The Good News Club is a private Christian organization for children
ages 6 to 12.346 It meets weekly after school and conducts activities such
as reading Bible verses, singing songs, and praying. 347 The Good News
Club asked to use the school facilities on a weekly basis so that it could
engage children in those activities. The superintendent and the school
attorney reviewed the Club's materials, determined that its activities were
the equivalent of religious instruction, and denied the Club's request.348
The Club then filed suit in federal court and was granted a preliminary
injunction, which allowed it to use the school facilities for its meetings for
approximately one year.34 9 Thereafter, the court vacated the injunction
and granted the school's motion for summary judgment. The Club ap-
pealed, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the school's pol-
icy, finding that the policy differentiated groups seeking access to its
facilities on the basis of subject matter but did not engage in unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination.350 The Club then sought and received re-
lief from the U.S. Supreme Court.35 1
The parties agreed that the school had established a limited public fo-
rum.352 When a school establishes a limited public forum, the Court
noted, it cannot discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint.
Central to the Supreme Court's analysis was the school's policy, which
allowed outside groups to use the school for "instruction in any branch of
education, learning, or the arts. ' 353 In addition, the official written policy
made the school available for "social, civic and recreational meetings and
entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the
community, provided that such uses [are] nonexclusive and [are] opened
to the general public. '354 The policy contained a prohibition against use
345. 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
346. Id. at 2098.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 2099.
350. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2099.
351. Id.
352. Id.




"by any individual or organization for religious purposes. '355
The Court found that Milford's policy allowed any group that promotes
the moral and character development of children to use the school build-
ing.356 The Good News Club teaches morals and character development,
but because Milford found the Club's activities to be religious in nature-
"the equivalent of religious instruction itself"-it excluded the Club from
the use of its facilities. 357 The Court found that this constituted the type
of viewpoint discrimination forbidden by the First Amendment. 358
Significantly, the Court rejected the school district's argument that,
even if its restriction on religious instruction constituted viewpoint dis-
crimination, excluding the Good News Club was necessary to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation.359 Although the Court conceded that
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation may be a compelling state
interest that could justify a content-based distinction, it was not con-
vinced that a state's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause viola-
tion would justify viewpoint discrimination. 360 The Court reached this
conclusion based on its finding that the meetings were held after school
hours, not sponsored by the school, and were open to any student who
obtained parental consent.361 Furthermore, the Court discounted the
idea that the Club's activities would have a coercive effect on elementary
school children. 362 Although the Court's own precedent indicates that
younger students would be more impressionable than adults, the Court
has "never extended [its] Establishment Clause jurisprudence to fore-
close private religious conduct during non-school hours merely because it
takes place on school premises where elementary school children may be
present. '363 In fact, the Court determined, allowing the Club to use the
school facilities would ensure neutrality. The Court also reasoned that
the danger that children would misperceive the endorsement of religion
was not any greater than the danger that they would perceive a hostility
towards religion if the Club were excluded from using the school. 364
The Court also rejected the notion that the community would feel coer-
cive pressure to engage in the Club's activities. 365 Interestingly, the
Court identified the relevant community as the parents, not the elemen-
tary school children.366 The Court based this conclusion on the fact that
parents must consent to their children's participation in the Club, and
therefore, the students could not be coerced into engaging in the Good
355. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2098.
356. Id. at 2101.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 2103.
360. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2103.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 2103-04.
363. Id. at 2104.
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News Club's religious activities.367 The Court was not persuaded that
parents of elementary school children would believe that the school was
endorsing religion by allowing the Good News Club to meet in the school
cafeteria after school.368
The Supreme Court's ruling will likely have a significant, practical im-
pact on the way many school districts handle requests for use of facilities.
Moreover, it will have a direct impact on Campbell v. Saint Tammany's
School Board, a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Case.369 In St.
Tammany's, the Fifth Circuit upheld a school district's policy that prohib-
ited non-students from using school facilities for religious worship or in-
struction.370 Although the Fifth Circuit noted that St. Tammany's policy
"skate[d] close to establishing a designated public forum," it ultimately
concluded that the policy's restrictions were sufficient to maintain the
non-public forum status of the school buildings.371 From the Fifth Cir-
cuit's perspective, the policy did not forbid speakers on general topics
with a religious perspective and was, therefore, neutral and constitu-
tional. After the en banc court refused to rehear the decision, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision, and
ordered it to reconsider its panel decision in light of Good News Club v.
Milford Central School.372
Chiu v. Plano Independent School District, another Fifth Circuit deci-
sion, also tackled the facilities use issue. 373 In this case, two parents at-
tempted to criticize the new math curriculum at "Math Night" meetings
held at several schools, but were instructed by the district not to dis-
tribute leaflets or articles, collect signatures on a petition, or display signs
with a hotline number on school premises.374 The district also refused to
allow another parent to use the school mail delivery system to distribute
flyers and petitions that were critical of the program. The parents sued
the school district and its administrators under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
claiming violations of their free speech rights.375 The district court denied
the administrators' motions for summary judgment, ruling that they had
all failed to establish qualified immunity. 376 All but one of the adminis-
trators failed to obtain relief on appeal. 377
Because the record contained conflicting evidence regarding the extent
of the use granted by Plano ISD for the Math Night events, the Fifth
Circuit determined that it did not have appellate jurisdiction over the de-
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 121 S. Ct. 2518
(2000).
370. St. Tammany's, 206 F.3d at 484.
371. Id. at 486-487.
372. See Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001).
373. 260 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001).
374. Id. at 337-39.
375. Id. at 339-40.
376. Id. at 340 n.5.
377. Id. at 340.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
fendants' claims related to Math Night. 378
On the school mail claim, however, the record revealed that the district
had not intended to open its school mail system to the general public to
facilitate debate on issues of public concern; the mail system was, there-
fore, a limited or nonpublic forum. 379 Moreover, the school district had
not previously allowed any other organization to use the school mail sys-
tem to distribute politically-oriented flyers to parents. The court reaf-
firmed that "[i]dentity-based and subject matter distinctions in a
nonpublic forum are perfectly permissible so long as they are not a covert
attempt to suppress a particular viewpoint and are reasonable in light of
the purpose of the forum. '380 The administrator who denied the parents'
use of the school mail system did not, therefore, engage in viewpoint dis-
crimination and was entitled to qualified immunity. 381
In other developments, school districts learned whether they may be
held liable under the False Claims Act. 382 The Garibaldi case arose when
a school district's internal auditor, Carlos Samuel, alleged that the school
board was exceptionally high rates for its unemployment and workers'
compensation insurance to district programs that were financed by the
federal government. 383 The auditor and his supervisor prepared a report
contending that the board violated federal accounting principles and the
False Claims Act by submitting false claims to the federal government.384
The superintendent hired two accounting firms to review the accounting
decisions. Both firms found that the board had violated neither federal
accounting principles, nor the False Claims Act.38 5 The school board sub-
sequently fired the auditors. 386
Garibaldi and Samuel filed a qui tam suit against the school board,
alleging, on behalf of the United States, that the board had submitted
numerous false claims to the United States over a period of eleven
years.387 The plaintiffs further alleged that they had been retaliated
against in violation of the protections the False Claims Act provides to
whistleblowers. A jury found that the school board had submitted over
1500 false claims to the federal government and that Samuel and Gari-
baldi had suffered illegal retaliation. 38 8 The district court ordered the
board to pay treble damages in the amount of $22.8 million and a civil
penalty of $7.85 million. "As their bounty" for their actions, Garibaldi
and Samuel were awarded damages for pain and suffering and back pay,
378. Chiu, 260 F.3d at 355.
379. Id. at 350.
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381. Id.
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as well as 25 percent of the damages and civil penalty awards granted to
the United States.389 They were also awarded attorney's fees, expenses,
and costs. 390
The school board appealed, arguing that, as a local government, it
could not be held liable under the False Claims Act.391 "The False Claims
Act makes any 'person' who knowingly presents a false claim to the fed-
eral government for payment liable for treble damages and a civil pen-
alty."' 392 The school board argued that a local government is not a
"person" under the Act.393 The issue was one of first impression for the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
394
The court acknowledged that while a recent Supreme Court decision,
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,395
did not decide the issue, it provided guidance. 396 The Fifth Circuit Court
found particularly persuasive the Supreme Court's reasoning that the
False Claims Act's treble damages were punitive in nature and as such
contrary to the long-standing presumption that local governments are not
subject to punitive damages. "Imposing punitive damages on a local gov-
ernment in favor of the federal government is especially problematic,"
the court noted.397 Requiring such payments, the court reasoned, would
"reflect a judgment by Congress that denying the schoolchildren of Orle-
ans Parish needed services, or requiring the taxpayers ... to pay higher
taxes, is justified in light of the relatively minor benefit to the federal
treasury. '398 In the absence of clear language in the False Claims Act
indicating an intent to impose punitive damages on a local government
under the Act, the Fifth Circuit declined to impute such intent to
Congress. 399
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that the term "person" in
the liability provisions of the False Claims Act does not include local gov-
ernments such as school boards.400 The court could find no statutory sup-
port for such a reading of the statute, nor could it identify any legislative
intent or purpose that would undermine that conclusion. 401 Therefore, it
vacated the judgment below and rendered judgment in favor of the Orle-
ans Parish School Board.40 2
Of all the cases from the past year, Falvo v. Owasso Independent
School District may have the most profound effect on educational activi-
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 483.
392. Garibaldi, 244 F.3d at 483.
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ties through its interpretation of the Family Education Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA). 40 3 Although FERPA has been in place for almost 30
years, the United States Supreme Court had never considered a FERPA
dispute prior to 2001. On June 25, 2001, the Court agreed to hear a case
from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, when it granted certiorari in
Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo.404 The case below involved
a common school district practice: a teacher would have students grade
one another's papers and call out their grades when they got them
back.40 5 A parent complained about this practice, claiming that it "se-
verely embarrassed" her children, but the school district refused to pro-
hibit the practice. A federal district court granted the school district's
motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that the grades did
not constitute "education records" as defined by FERPA.
Falvo argued that the court should have granted judgment in favor of
her son, a special education student, because he had an expectation of
privacy in his grades under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).406 The district court denied that motion, concluding that
Falvo could not premise a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim on the
IDEA since she could not make a distinct claim under the IDEA.40 7
On appeal, the parent raised two issues. First, she argued that the right
to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited disclosure of the
students' grades.408 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
in order to warrant constitutional protection, a party's expectation of pri-
vacy in the information must be "highly personal or intimate. '40 9 Al-
though the court recognized that school work and test grades could be
somewhat personal or intimate, it refused to conclude that these grades
were so highly personal or intimate as to merit constitutional protec-
tion.410 The court further determined that neither FERPA nor the IDEA
created a constitutional privacy right.411
The parties did not raise the issue of whether a violation of FERPA
could be the basis for a lawsuit under Section 1983, but the court assumed
that subject matter jurisdiction was "implicated," and that the remedial
scheme within FERPA itself did not foreclose a Section 1983 remedy.412
The parent's second claim was that the school district's practice vio-
lated FERPA.413 The court of appeals first decided that the district court
inappropriately deferred to a letter from the director of the FPCO, be-
403. 233 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Family Education Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA)).
404. 121 S. Ct. 2547 (2001).
405. Falvo, 233 F.3d at 1207.
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cause it was "bereft of any reasoning underlying the rather conclusory
opinion," and because its statutory interpretation ignored the broader
language of FERPA that states that an "education record" includes
records maintained by a person acting for the educational institution.414
Disregarding the FPCO's interpretation, the court made its own assess-
ment of the statute. First, it determined that the grades students record
on one another's papers and report to the teacher constitute "education
records" under FERPA, because the grades contain information directly
related to a student. 415 Next, because at least some of the grades are
ultimately recorded in the teacher's grade book, they are "maintained by
an educational institution," and are therefore "education records" pro-
tected by FERPA.416 Although the court recognized that a teacher's
grade book could be excluded from the statutory definition of "education
record," under the "sole possession of the maker" exception, this excep-
tion applies only when the grade books are not disclosed to others (ex-
cept for substitutes). 417 Finally, the court considered whether the grades
are also protected by FERPA at the "more preliminary stage when one
student simply writes the grade of a fellow student on homework and test
papers. '418 By assisting the teacher, the court found, the students are
acting for the district, and when the student places a grade on the paper,
the grade is "maintained," because the student is preserving the grade
until the time it is reported to the teacher for further use. 419 In reaching
this conclusion, the court of appeals noted that it would be inconsistent
with Congressional intent to allow a teacher to disclose students' grades
to other students immediately before recording them, but to prohibit a
teacher from revealing to one student the grades of another when writing
the grades in a grade book.420
Unlike the trial court below, the court of appeals granted the individual
defendants qualified immunity.421 While the court found the statute un-
ambiguous, it found no authority indicating that the school district's prac-
tice violated FERPA.422 Despite its disregard of and disagreement with
the FPCO's interpretation, the existence of that letter led the court to
conclude that the right it identified was not clearly established at the time
the case arose. Therefore, qualified immunity was appropriate. 42 3
As of this writing, the Supreme Court had not issued a decision in the
appeal of this case. Its decision is expected in late Spring of 2002. How-
ever the case is decided, it will be an important one for school districts.
Having the Supreme Court's view of FERPA will be of valuable guidance
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and may initiate a change in how the Department of Education reads the
law.
H. RELIGION
The basic premises concerning religion in public schools have long
been known, but new practices, such as one initiated by Beaumont Inde-
pendent School District, still make their way to the courts. At issue in
Doe v. Beaumont Independent School District was the school district's ini-
tiation of a "Clergy in the Schools Program" that asked volunteers from
local clergy to counsel groups of students about secular issues, including
race, divorce, discipline, and drug use.424 Before the district began the
program, a parent read about it in the newspaper and requested the inclu-
sion of professionals from secular counseling professions in the pro-
gram. 42 5 When the district turned down her request, the parent, along
with other plaintiffs, brought suit to enjoin the program. The plaintiffs
claimed the program violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment and the Texas Constitution.42 6 A federal district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, but the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court in a panel decision. 427
Beaumont ISD sought, and was granted, review by the en banc court.428
The en banc court of appeals agreed that the plaintiffs had demon-
strated standing sufficient to withstand summary judgment. 429 If proven
at trial, the court reasoned, the students could be deprived of their right
to participate in the school's program without taking part in an unconsti-
tutional practice. 430 In considering the merits of the claim, the court
framed the ultimate question in the case as one of equal treatment:
whether the school board preferred religion to non-religion in its
program.431
The court analyzed the plaintiffs' claims according to Supreme Court
precedent. Although the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,432 has
fallen into disfavor by many courts, the Fifth Circuit applied its three-
prong test here.433 First, the court concluded that it could not find as a
matter of law that the stated purpose of the program was not secular. 434
This issue would, therefore, have to be resolved at trial.435 The court
then considered the second prong of the Lemon test: whether the pro-
424. 240 F.3d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).
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gram has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 436 It de-
termined that the key question in assessing the program's neutrality
toward or endorsement of religion is the context in which the program is
presented.437 Crucial to this determination was the review of all volun-
teer programs operated by the school district, not just the Clergy in
Schools program. 438 In remanding the case, therefore, the Fifth Circuit
instructed the district court to consider the entire set of volunteer pro-
grams when determining whether the district favored religion over
nonreligion.439
The third prong of the Lemon test bars excessive entanglement.440 The
court found no excessive entanglement because the district monitors all
of its volunteer programs; this one does not require the district to take on
additional, unique burdens.441
In conclusion, the court stressed that the case would have to be sent
back for trial, primarily because "the record evidence leaves... a blurred
picture of the District's volunteer program as a whole. ' 442 The court de-
clared that if the program is viewed on a fully-developed record as part of
a larger scheme of secular mentoring programs, it has not violated the
Establishment Clause.443 And, the court explained, the reasons for the
district's refusal to add non-clergy counselors to the program must be
settled by a factfinder.444 It therefore reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded to the district court for further proceedings, in-
cluding trial if necessary. 445
Judge Jolly, joined by four other judges (Jones, Barksdale, Garza,
Smith, DeMoss) dissented on the standing issue. 446 Judge Jolly criticized
the majority for creating an injury where the plaintiffs had failed to allege
one. 44 7 Meanwhile, Judge Jones, joined by four judges (Smith, Barksdale,
Garza, and DeMoss), dissented from the decision to remand the case for
further proceedings. 448 "Eight of us say that the clergy in schools (CIS)
program is or may be constitutional, six say it can never be so, and one
abstains on the merits for jurisprudential reasons," Judge Jones wrote. 449
She went on to question the value of remand, pointing out that the en
banc court had provided no clear direction to the district court or the
parties. 450 She found it quite obvious that the CISD program did "not
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inculcate religious beliefs or practices," and that "any benefit to religion
[was] too attenuated to violate the Establishment Clause. '451 The dis-
senters would, therefore, decline to remand the case and affirm the dis-
trict court's original ruling that the program is constitutional as a matter
of law.452
Judge Weiner, joined by Judges Politz, Benavides, Stewart, Parker, and
Dennis dissented to express their belief that the summary judgment evi-
dence was sufficient to resolve this matter.453 Judge Weiner emphasized
that the program symbolically endorses religion, striking at the "core con-
cern of the Establishment Clause: the protection of citizens from the
specter of government interference and favoritism in the inextricably in-
tertwined domains of conscience, religion, and morality. '454 Further-
more, he stated, the district overtly advanced religion by granting
preferential status to the clergy in this program.455 The district's only
conceivable purpose in excluding all other vocations and professions from
the program, he argued, would be to ensure that students "would receive
a perspective on morality grounded in religion. '456 To drive the point
home, Judge Weiner applied all of the Supreme Court's tests to deter-
mine the validity of the program under the Establishment Clause and
found the program to be "indisputably unconstitutional. '457
Although the Clergy in Schools program passed muster, it did so with
only the weakest support of the court of appeals. It is the unenviable task
of the district court to interpret the strong difference of opinions regard-
ing the resolution of this matter.
I. CONCLUSION
As has become the norm, school districts faced a variety of legal chal-
lenges in 2000-2001. While courts understand schools' need to maintain a
safe learning environment, the cases reviewed here do not reflect judicial
hesitation to intervene if the court identifies a legal violation. The laws as
applied to schools are continually being refined, providing guidance for
those that have been fortunate enough to avoid liability, and correction
to those that have erred.
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